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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This case has its genesis in Congress' creative effort 
to promote the use of alternative energy sources by state and 
federal utility authorities.  To make the nation more energy 
independent, Congress sought to encourage small power production 
facilities that use renewable fuels, such as solar, wind, biomass 
and water, and cogeneration facilities that use traditional fuels 
more efficiently by sequentially producing both electricity and 
steam or other useful thermal energy.  Freehold Cogeneration 
Associates, L.P. ("Freehold") is the type of facility that 
Congress wished to promote. 
 On January 19, 1994, Freehold sought a declaratory 
judgment in the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey that the Board of Regulatory Commissioners of the 
State of New Jersey (the "BRC") was preempted by the Federal 
Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act ("PURPA") from modifying 
  
the terms of a previously approved power purchase agreement 
("PPA") between Freehold and Jersey Central Power and Light 
Company ("JCP&L"), a New Jersey public utility.  Freehold also 
sought an order enjoining the ongoing BRC proceedings.  Freehold 
moved for summary judgment, and the BRC and JCP&L moved to 
dismiss on various grounds.  The district court denied Freehold's 
motion for summary judgment and granted the defendants' motion to 
dismiss, holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
hear the matter.  Freehold filed a timely appeal to this court.1 
 We reverse. 
 I. 
 Under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 791a et seq., 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (the "FERC") had the 
exclusive authority to regulate "public utilities" that sell 
electric power at wholesale in interstate commerce.  Id. at § 
824(e).  In 1978, Congress modified the Federal Power Act with 
the enactment of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, 16 
U.S.C. § 823a et seq., as part of a comprehensive legislative 
effort to combat a nationwide energy crisis.  PURPA is intended 
to control power generation costs and ensure long-term economic 
growth by reducing the nation's reliance on oil and gas and 
increasing the use of more abundant domestically produced fuels.  
In enacting PURPA, Congress directed the FERC to promulgate rules 
                     
1
.  This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over 
this appeal from the district court's final judgment.  The 
jurisdiction of the district court is discussed in section II, 
infra.  
  
and regulations requiring public utilities to buy electric energy 
from, and to sell electric energy to, qualifying cogeneration 
facilities ("QFs").  16 U.S.C. § 824a-3.2  Congress directed 
state regulatory authorities, such as the BRC, to implement the 
rules and regulations promulgated by the FERC.  Id. 
 In early 1988, pursuant to the then-effective 
cogeneration policies and procedures of the New Jersey Board of 
Public Utilities (the "BPU"), the predecessor agency to the BRC, 
Freehold commenced negotiations with JCP&L concerning a potential 
power purchase agreement.  During the pendency of these 
negotiations, the BPU adopted certain competitive bidding 
guidelines which replaced negotiation as the method by which 
utilities were to procure long-term power purchase agreements 
with cogeneration facilities such as Freehold. 
 After these competitive bidding guidelines took effect, 
Freehold petitioned the BPU to "grandfather" or exempt it from 
the newly adopted guidelines.  JCP&L opposed the petition.  By 
Order dated July 31, 1989, the BPU agreed to grandfather 
Freehold.  Freehold's negotiations with JCP&L were thereby  
governed by the pre-existing policies and procedures, which 
allowed Freehold and JCP&L to negotiate the terms of a power 
                     
2
.  A cogeneration facility is one which produces electrical 
energy, and steam or forms of useful energy which are used for 
industrial commercial, heating, or cooling purposes.  16 U.S.C. § 
796(18)(A).  In order to qualify as a QF, a facility must meet 
the requirements set forth by the FERC, 18 C.F.R. § 292.101, et 
seq., and the facility must be owned by an entity not primarily 
engaged in the generation or sale of electrical power, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 796(18)(B).  Freehold is a QF. 
  
purchase agreement.  On March 26, 1992, after three years of 
extensive negotiations, Freehold and JCP&L entered into a power 
purchase agreement (the "PPA"), to commence on the date of BRC 
approval and to continue thereafter for a period of twenty years.  
The BRC approved the PPA by order dated July 8, 1992.3 
 Under the terms of the PPA, JCP&L is to pay Freehold 
100% of JCP&L's 1989 avoided cost for the purchase of electrical 
power.  Avoided cost is the cost which JCP&L avoids by purchasing 
energy from Freehold rather than generating the energy itself or 
purchasing it from some other source. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(d).   
 On April 12, 1993, in response to decreases in the cost 
of obtaining electrical power, the BRC directed public utilities 
to notify it of any power supply contracts which were no longer 
economically beneficial.  The BRC wished to encourage buy outs 
and other remedial measures to reduce power costs. 
 After reviewing its contract with Freehold, JCP&L 
concluded that the PPA should be modified.  On April 16, 1993, 
JCP&L contacted Freehold and proposed a buy out of the PPA.  
Freehold rejected the proposal.  On May 12, 1993, JCP&L notified 
the BRC that the PPA was no longer an economically beneficial 
                     
3
.  JCP&L challenges the BRC's 1988 order grandfathering Freehold 
from the 1988 rate guidelines, and the 1992 BRC order approving 
the rates.  However, both of these orders are now final and 
nonappealable.   
 
Additionally, we will not address the Division of the Ratepayer 
Advocate's ("DRA") argument that the BRC's approval of a 1989 
avoided cost in 1992 was ultra vires because the DRA is making 
this argument for the first time on appeal. See Patterson v. 
Cuyler, 729 F.2d 925, 929 (3d Cir. 1984). 
  
contract because the contractual avoided cost was significantly 
higher than the current avoided cost due to the decrease in the 
cost of obtaining electrical power.  On September 22, 1993, JCP&L 
again proposed a buy out to Freehold, which Freehold again 
rejected.  The BRC then unsuccessfully attempted to formulate a 
joint agreement between the parties modifying the PPA.  By order 
dated January 5, 1994, the BRC directed the parties to 
renegotiate the purchase rate term of the PPA or, in the 
alternative, to negotiate an appropriate buy out of the PPA.  The 
order further provided that if the parties did not reach an 
agreement within 30 days of the order, the BRC would commence an 
evidentiary hearing to consider various courses of action. 
 Freehold filed this action on January 14, 1994, seeking 
a judgment declaring that the BRC's order is preempted by PURPA 
and a court order enjoining the enforcement of that order.  The 
district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding 
that section 210(g) of PURPA, 18 U.S.C. § 824a-3(g), and the 
Johnson Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1342, divested it of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  The court further found that the PPA, which refers 
disputes under the agreement to "the BRC or a court of competent 
jurisdiction in the State of New Jersey," supported its finding 
that there was no federal jurisdiction.  The district court did 
not address the preemption argument in its opinion. 
 II. 
 In enacting PURPA, Congress sought to overcome 
traditional electric utilities' reluctance to purchase power from 
nontraditional electric generation facilities and to reduce the  
  
financial burden of state and federal regulation on 
nontraditional facilities. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 
750-51 (1982).  To overcome the first impediment to developing 
nontraditional sources of power, section 210(a) of PURPA, 16 
U.S.C. § 824a-3, requires the FERC to prescribe "such rules as it 
determines necessary to encourage cogeneration and small power 
production," including rules requiring traditional utilities to 
purchase electricity from QFs.  FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 
751.  State regulatory authorities will then implement these 
rules.  16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(f). 
 To surmount the second obstacle, section 210(e) of 
PURPA requires the FERC to implement regulations exempting QFs 
from federal regulation to which traditional electric utilities 
are subject, including most provisions of the Federal Power Act 
and "[s]tate laws and regulations respecting the rates, or 
respecting the financial or organizational regulation, of 
electric utilities."  16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a)(1).  In accordance 
with these provisions of PURPA, the FERC promulgated regulations 
governing transactions between utilities and QFs, including a 
specific requirement that a utility must purchase electricity 
made available by QFs at a rate up to the utility's full avoided 
cost.  18 C.F.R. §§ 292.303-304 (1993).   
 Acting pursuant to section 210(e)(1) of PURPA, the FERC 
also promulgated regulations exempting QFs from various federal 
and state regulatory requirements.  The regulations state in 
pertinent part: 
  
 (1) Any [QF] shall be exempted . . . from 
State law or regulation respecting: 
 
  (i) The rates of electric 
utilities; and 
 
  (ii) The financial and 
organizational regulation of 
electric utilities. 
18 C.F.R. § 292.602(c). 
 A. 
 Freehold asserts that the district court had federal 
question jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
because Freehold claimed that the BRC proceeding violated its 
federally-established PURPA rights.  As support, Freehold relies 
on Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983), in which 
the Court stated: 
 It is beyond dispute that federal courts have 
jurisdiction over suits to enjoin state 
officials from interfering with federal 
rights. . . .  A plaintiff who seeks 
injunctive relief from state regulation, on 
the ground that such regulation is pre-empted 
by a federal statute which, by virtue of the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must 
prevail, thus presents a federal question 
which the federal courts have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve. 
Id. at 96 n.14 (citations omitted).  Accord Airco Industrial 
Gases, Inc. Div. of BOC Group, Inc. v. Teamsters Health & Welfare 
Pension Fund, 850 F.2d 1028, 1032-34 (3d Cir. 1988) (district 
court subject matter jurisdiction under section 1331 turns on 
whether cause of action arises under laws of United States). 
 The district court did not address section 1331 
jurisdiction, but rather read section 210(g) of PURPA as carving 
  
out an exception to federal jurisdiction over all PURPA claims 
except those involving judicial review of a final decision by the 
FERC.  The district court reasoned that: 
 [B]y enacting [section 210(g)], Congress 
specifically provided that judicial review of 
orders by the State regulatory authorities 
was to be made only by the state courts or 
FERC.  The only instance where Congress 
provided for federal court jurisdiction is 
where a party seeks judicial review of a 
decision by FERC.  Here, FERC has made no 
determination which this Court might review, 
nor does Freehold allege this as a basis for 
jurisdiction.  Thus, under PURPA, this Court 
does not have jurisdiction over Freehold's 
challenge to the BRC's order.   
 Section 210(g)'s language, however, shows that it is 
more limited in scope than the district court believed.  Section 
210(g) provides: 
  (1) Judicial review may be obtained 
respecting any proceeding conducted by a 
State regulatory authority or nonregulated 
electric utility for purposes of implementing 
any requirement of a rule under subsection 
(a) . . . [under the same requirements as 
judicial review may be obtained under 16 
U.S.C. § 2633] (emphasis added). 
 
Thus, section 210(g)(1) applies only to review of proceedings by 
state regulators or nonregulated utilities designed to implement 
any requirement of rules promulgated by the FERC pursuant to 
section 210(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a).  Section 210(a) requires 
utilities to purchase energy from and sell energy to qualifying 
facilities at certain prices.4 
                     
4
.  Section 210(g)(2) is not applicable to this action.  That 
section provides: 
 
  
 The parties disagree as to whether Freehold is 
challenging the BRC's implementation of the FERC's rules under 
section 210(a) or whether it is challenging the BRC's actions 
under section 210(e) and supporting regulations.  Freehold 
argues, and the FERC, as amicus, agrees, that Freehold is not 
challenging the validity of state action implementing the rules 
adopted by the FERC pursuant to section 210(a).  Rather, it 
alleges that the BRC proceeding is inconsistent with and 
preempted by section 210(e) and the FERC regulations promulgated 
thereunder, which exempt QFs from state utility regulation.  See 
16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e)(1); 18 C.F.R. § 292.602(c).  
 The defendants argue that Freehold's complaint was 
brought under section 210(a) of PURPA because the complaint 
refers to the FERC's rules implemented under subsection (a).  
Before the district court, Freehold clearly relied upon FERC's 
rules implemented under section 210(a) in arguing that the BRC's 
actions were preempted.  As noted by Freehold, however, such 
(..continued) 
 Any person (including the Secretary) may 
bring an action against any electric utility, 
qualifying small power producer, or 
qualifying cogenerator to enforce any 
requirement established by a State regulatory 
authority or nonregulated electric utility 
pursuant to subsection (f).  [Such action 
shall be brought under the same requirements 
as judicial review may be obtained under 16 
U.S.C. § 2633]. 
 
This case does not involve a state regulation promulgated 
pursuant to section 210(f), which governs the sale and purchase 
of electricity between utilities and QFs, nor was it brought by a 
person against a QF to enforce such a regulation. 
  
references were necessary to explain what the FERC's PURPA rules 
provided in order to establish that the BRC's actions were 
outside those rules.  The pleadings reasonably can be read to 
assert a claim that the BRC proceeding is inconsistent with and 
preempted by section 210(e) of PURPA and the FERC regulations 
promulgated thereunder, which exempt QFs from state utility 
regulation.  See Bristol Energy Corp. v. New Hampshire Pub. 
Utils. Comm'n, 13 F.3d 471, 474 (1st Cir. 1994) (even though 
defendant sent out data requests pursuant to a certain statute 
which precluded federal jurisdiction, the court agreed with 
plaintiffs that the case did not "arise under" that statute, but 
rather implicated principles of preemption relating to the QF 
exemption and the Supremacy Clause, which triggered federal 
question jurisdiction). 
 The BRC actually concedes that Freehold's complaint was 
not brought to obtain review of a Board proceeding to implement 
the FERC rules as required by the jurisdictional limitation in 
section 210(g) of PURPA.  Relying on Greensboro Lumber Co. v. 
Georgia Power Co., 643 F. Supp. 1345 (N.D. Ga. 1986), aff'd, 844 
F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1988), however, the BRC argues that 
Freehold's complaint contends that the BRC has failed to adhere 
to its own implementation plan under the FERC regulations by 
attempting to revoke or modify its prior approval of the PPA.  
Thus, the BRC submits that "Freehold's complaint [involves] a 
claim with regard to the Board's Order implementing the FERC 
rules." 
  
 The district court also relied on Greensboro.  In that 
case, the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia 
held that section 210(g) divested it of jurisdiction over a QF's 
claim that a nonregulated utility failed to adhere to its own 
implementation plan in its dealings with the QF.  Greensboro, 643 
F. Supp. at 1374.  The court held that PURPA requires that such 
an "as applied" claim "must be bought (sic) in state court, which 
has exclusive jurisdiction 'to enforce any requirement' of a 
nonregulated utility's implementation plan."  Id. (citing 16 
U.S.C. § 824a-3(g)(2)).  Thus, PURPA divested the court of 
jurisdiction because the case involved a claim arising under 
section 210(f)(1).   
 In contrast, this case does not involve a claim arising 
under section 210(f), see supra note 4, but rather a claim 
arising under section 210(e).  Freehold does not allege that an 
unregulated authority has failed to provide service to it in 
violation of the authority's implementation plan, or otherwise 
challenge the BRC's implementation of FERC rules "as applied."  
Rather, Freehold complains that the BRC has interfered with its 
federally-granted right to be exempt from certain utility-type 
state regulation.  See Independent Energy Producers Ass'n v. 
California Pub. Utils. Comm'n, No. C-91-2644 MHP, 1992 WL 533058 
(N.D. Cal. June 3, 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 36 F.3d 848 
(9th Cir. 1994). 
 Because Freehold is essentially claiming that the BRC 
is subjecting it to regulations precluded by section 210(e), the 
jurisdictional limitations of sections 210(g)(1) regarding state 
  
proceedings implementing any requirement of a rule enacted under 
subsection (a) are not relevant to the district court's 
jurisdiction.  Thus, it was error to dismiss Freehold's complaint 
on the basis of PURPA's jurisdictional limitations.  The district 
court possessed jurisdiction to hear Freehold's preemption claim 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
 B. 
 The district court also found that it must dismiss 
Freehold's complaint because the Johnson Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1342, 
eliminated jurisdiction.  In enacting the Johnson Act, Congress 
intended to seriously curtail federal jurisdiction over the 
subject of state utility rates.  See Zucker v. Bell Telephone 
Co., 373 F. Supp. 748, 750 (E.D.Pa. 1974), aff'd, 510 F.2d 971 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1027 (1975).  The Johnson Act 
provides: 
 The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend 
or restrain the operation of, or compliance 
with, any order affecting rates chargeable by 
a public utility and made by a State 
administrative agency or a rate-making body 
of a State political subdivision where: 
 
 (1)  Jurisdiction is based solely on 
diversity of citizenship or repugnance of the 
order to the Federal Constitution; and, 
 
 (2)  The order does not interfere with 
interstate commerce; and, 
 
 (3)  The order has been made after reasonable 
notice and hearing; and, 
 
 (4)  A plain, speedy and efficient remedy may 
be had in the courts of such State. 
  
All four of the Act's criteria must be met for it to apply.  See 
Zucker, 373 F. Supp. at 751. 
 The district court concluded that all four elements 
were present in this case.  It held that the first requirement 
had been met because Freehold sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief on the basis that the BRC's Order was preempted by PURPA.  
The court concluded, "[i]t is apparent that Freehold alleges 
jurisdiction on the basis that the Order is repugnant to the 
Federal Constitution since Freehold claims that the Supremacy 
Clause mandates that  the Order give way to PURPA." 
 The Johnson Act, however, requires that jurisdiction be 
based solely on the federal constitution.  Freehold's claim that 
the BRC's order is preempted does not rely solely on 
constitutional grounds, but also relies on PURPA, a federal 
statute.  In a similar case, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that the Johnson Act did not preclude federal jurisdiction 
over a claim that a public service commission's refusal of relief 
was in conflict with and preempted by the Federal Power Act.  The 
court reasoned: 
 It is true, of course, that a federal statute 
overrides conflicting state law only because 
of the Supremacy Clause of the Federal 
Constitution.  In a sense, therefore, a 
preemption claim always asserts repugnance of 
state law to the Federal Constitution.  But 
such a claim does not usually require that 
the Constitution itself be interpreted.  
Rather, the meaning of federal statutes and 
of state law must be explored, and the extent 
of any conflict ascertained.  A state law 
struck down on the basis of preemption is 
perhaps more aptly labeled "unstatutory" than 
"unconstitutional."  In any case, whatever 
  
the theoretical arguments might be, all of 
the appellate authority in point of which we 
are aware upholds federal jurisdiction in 
utility rate cases where a substantial claim 
of federal statutory preemption is pleaded. 
Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 829 
F.2d 1444, 1449 (8th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).5 
 Thus, a statutorily-based preemption claim does not 
provide a basis for invoking the Johnson Act to deprive a federal 
court of jurisdiction.  Because this case does not meet the first 
prong of the Johnson Act analysis, it is not necessary for this 
court to reach the remaining prongs. 
 C. 
 The district court further concluded that it lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction because the PPA contains a choice of 
forum provision providing that all disputes arising under the PPA 
                     
5
.  See also Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 827 F.2d 
1264, 1273 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1218 (1988); 
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. New Orleans, 782 F.2d 1236, 1242-
42 (5th Cir. 1986), withdrawn in part on other grounds, 798 F.2d 
858 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1023 (1987); Aluminum 
Co. of America v. Utilities Comm'n of North Carolina, 713 F.2d 
1024, 1028 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984); 
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 1245 v. 
Public Serv. Comm'n, 614 F.2d 206, 210 (9th Cir. 1980); Kentucky 
West Virginia Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 620 F. 
Supp. 1458, 1460-61 (M.D. Pa. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 791 
F.2d 1111 (3d Cir. 1986).   
 
In Kentucky West Virginia, the defendant did not appeal the 
district court's decision that the Johnson Act did not deprive it 
of jurisdiction, so this court did not discuss the issue.  The 
cases cited by JCP&L are not to the contrary because none of them 
involve preemption claims.  Rather, they involve claims under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, the gravamen of which is a violation of federal 
constitutional rights.  The BRC has not raised the Johnson Act 
issue on appeal.  
  
would be resolved either by the BRC or by a New Jersey state 
court.  The court reasoned: 
 The parties provided that the PPA "shall be 
governed by and construed in accordance with 
the laws of the State of New Jersey 
applicable to contracts made and to be 
performed in that State, irrespective of the 
application of any conflicts of laws 
provisions."  Further, the parties "agree[d] 
that all disputes arising under [the PPA] not 
resolved between the parties shall be decided 
by a petition to the BRC or a court of 
competent jurisdiction in the State of New 
Jersey and [Freehold] hereby submits itself 
to the jurisdiction of the BRC or such court 
for such purposes. 
 PURPA and its regulations do not prevent Freehold from 
waiving its statutory rights, see 18 C.F.R. § 292.301(b)(1), and 
thus Freehold may legally consent to have PPA disputes heard in 
state court.  The choice of law and choice of forum provisions 
quoted by the district court, however, merely demonstrate that 
Freehold agreed to submit disputes arising under the PPA to 
either the BRC or a court of competent jurisdiction of the State 
of New Jersey, not that it gave up its right to be exempt from 
state laws and regulation.  Freehold's complaint demonstrates 
that this is not an action to resolve a dispute under the PPA, 
but rather, a preemption claim against the BRC.  Thus, the 
district court erred in holding that the PPA supports a finding 
that it lacks jurisdiction to hear this matter.6 
                     
6
.  On appeal, JCP&L also contends that a federal court should 
abstain from resolving the merits of this case even if it 
possesses subject matter jurisdiction.  We disagree. 
 
Abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), Burford 
v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) and Railroad Com. of Texas v. 
  
 III. 
 The defendants argue that if the federal courts have 
jurisdiction and abstention is inapplicable, this court should 
not address the merits of the preemption question, but should 
remand for consideration to the district court.  JCP&L also 
argues that dismissal is mandated because Freehold's claim is 
moot and otherwise not ripe for adjudication.  JCP&L and the BRC 
additionally assert that there are disputes over material facts 
that preclude any grant of summary judgment for Freehold and 
there are no "exceptional circumstances" justifying a resolution 
by this court of Freehold's motion for summary judgment.   
 On the other hand, Freehold asserts that its claim is 
ripe for adjudication as a matter of law because the BRC has been 
subjecting it to extensive state administrative, utility-type 
rate hearings and disclosure requirements since March 1994.  
Freehold vigorously argues that there are no factual issues to be 
(..continued) 
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) is "an extraordinary and narrow 
exception to the district court's duty to adjudicate a 
controversy properly before it, justified only in the exceptional 
circumstances where resort to state proceedings clearly serves an 
important countervailing interest."  United Services Auto. Asso. 
v. Muir, 792 F.2d 356, 360-61 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 
U.S. 1031 (1987).  The doctrine of discretionary abstention is 
predicated upon a federal policy of comity:  federal courts of 
equity should exercise their discretionary power with proper 
consideration for the independence of state government in 
carrying out its governmental functions.  In this case, however, 
our concern is with carrying out a federal statutory scheme 
promoting the development of alternative energy sources.  The 
alleged intrusive action is not by the federal government, but, 
on the contrary, by a state regulatory agency.  We conclude that 
abstention is not appropriate in this case and does not warrant 
any extended discussion. 
  
considered in addressing the legal question of preemption, and 
that the appellees have had ample opportunity to make every 
argument that they could in defense against Freehold's claim that 
PURPA preempts the BRC's order.  Freehold notes that the only 
alleged factual dispute that the BRC and JCP&L have been able to 
claim before this court is whether the so-called "regulatory out" 
clause permits the BRC to modify Freehold's contractual rates.  
Freehold, however, counters that the "regulatory-out" clause 
dispute requires no additional factfinding because it involves 
only a simple contract construction issue capable of resolution 
on the face of the PPA.  We agree; the clause is unambiguous and 
requires no extrinsic evidence for its construction. 
 Freehold also contends that there are exceptional 
circumstances here that mandate disposition by this court of the 
preemption issue without remand to the district court.  It claims 
that the cogeneration project has already been delayed by the 
time-consuming and costly proceedings before the BRC and that 
every day adds immeasurably to the project's cost.  Freehold 
argues that interest rates are rising, equipment and construction 
costs are increasing, and the legal costs of this action and the 
action before the BRC are escalating, while the revenues from the 
project, if constructed, are fixed for the life of the contract 
with JCP&L.   
  A. 
 In light of the ongoing proceedings before the BRC, we 
see no merit whatsoever to the argument that the issue is moot.  
As to the question of ripeness, the Supreme Court stated in 
  
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), its leading 
discussion on the subject, and again reiterated in Pacific Gas & 
Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 
461 U.S. 190, 201 (1983), that the question of ripeness turns on 
"the fitness of the issue for judicial decision" and "the 
hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration."  
Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149. 
 In Presbytery of New Jersey of Orthodox Presbyterian 
Church v. Florio, No. 93-5559, 1994 WL 638864 (3d Cir. 1994), 
this court adopted the three part test from Step-Saver Data 
Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 912 F.2d 643, 647 (3d Cir. 
1990), to determine whether we would engage in pre-enforcement 
review in the context of a declaratory judgment action:  (1) the 
adversity of the parties' interests, (2) the conclusiveness of 
the judicial judgment, and (3) the utility of that judgment.  
Slip. op. at 14.   
 There can be no question here about the adversity of 
the parties' interests.  JCP&L seeks to alter or modify the PPA 
it entered into with Freehold on March 26, 1992.  The BRC, which 
had approved that contract consistent with PURPA's implementation 
requirements, subsequently directed Freehold and JCP&L to 
renegotiate the purchase price terms of the PPA or, in the 
alternative, to negotiate a buy out of the PPA.   Freehold 
rejected a renegotiation of the purchase price terms of the PPA 
and a buyout by JCP&L.  Since then, the BRC has commenced an 
extensive evidentiary proceeding to consider various courses of 
action, including the modification or revocation of its approval 
  
of the PPA.  In this litigation and on appeal, Freehold's 
position is diametrically opposed to that of the defendants.  
Thus, there is an actual concrete controversy "of sufficient 
immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory 
judgment."  Salvation Army v. Department of Community Affairs, 
919 F.2d 183, 192 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 
415 U.S. 452, 460 (1974)). 
 Furthermore, a judgment of this court will be 
conclusive.  It will determine whether the BRC proceedings 
conflict with or are expressly preempted as a matter of law by 
section 210(e) of PURPA and FERC's implementing rules.  Moreover, 
we are not persuaded that factual developments at the BRC 
proceedings would add anything to the legal construction of 
PURPA.   
 Finally, there remains for consideration the last of 
the Step-Saver three part test, the utility of such a judgment.  
Freehold convincingly contends that the BRC's proceeding is 
impeding Freehold's ability to obtain financing for its facility 
and jeopardizes not only the PPA, but also the project's 
financial viability. 
 Freehold also argues that additional delay may make it 
impossible to meet the construction and other deadlines contained 
in project contracts and permits.  This argument is very 
persuasive.  It takes but little experience in financial markets 
to realize that lending institutions will not lend a borrower 
large sums of money when the life of the underlying project is 
  
threatened by extensive litigation.7  While the BRC litigation 
has been in process and this appeal pending, the Federal Reserve 
Bank has increased interest rates six times.8  Additional costs 
because of the delay -- not only in interest, but also in 
material and labor costs -- are irrecoverable under the terms of 
the PPA.  Moveover, Freehold cannot recover damages from the BRC 
if it prevails on the merits.  
 In Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. 190, a question of 
preemption arose under circumstances where California's 
traditional role of regulating the generation and sale of 
electrical production challenged a complex federal scheme to 
promote the development of civilian nuclear energy.  The 
plaintiff utilities filed an action in the federal district court 
seeking a declaration that certain California regulations were 
invalid under the Supremacy Clause because they were preempted by 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1994.  Ripeness became an issue in the 
federal courts because the state administrative agency had not 
yet resolved the proceedings before it.  In disposing of the 
                     
7
.  In the submission to the BRC of the proposed joint 
modification agreement dated November 3, 1993, between Freehold 
and the Staff of the Board of Regulatory Commissioners, Freehold 
represented, and this representation was undisputed, that 
expeditious approval of the joint agreement "is necessary so that 
Freehold can go forward with the Project Financing.  The lending 
company will not make commitments until the issue of rate 
reduction is resolved."   
8
.  See 80 Fed. Reserve Bulletin 610 and 913.  See also John E. 
Woodruff, Fed jolts interest rates up, The Baltimore Sun, Nov. 
16, 1994, at 1A (discussing the Federal Reserve's increases in 
interest rates during 1994 and their effect on consumers and 
businesses). 
  
ripeness issue, the Court examined the Abbott Labs. test of the 
"fitness of the issue for judicial decision" and "the hardship to 
the parties of withholding court consideration" and concluded 
that both factors favored a finding that the issue was ripe for 
adjudication.  It stated: 
 The question of pre-emption is predominantly 
legal, and although it would be useful to 
have the benefit of California's 
interpretation of what constitutes a 
demonstrated technology or means for the 
disposal of high-level nuclear waste, 
resolution of the pre-emption issue need not 
await that development.  Moreover, 
postponement of decision would likely work 
substantial hardship on the utilities. 
 
Id. at 201.  The Court noted that one does not have to await the 
ultimate impact of the threatened injury to obtain preventive 
relief.  The imminence of the injury is sufficient.   
 In Middle South Energy, Inc. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. 
Comm'n, 772 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1102 
(1986), the complaint also raised a preemption challenge to state 
proceedings.  As in this case, the plaintiff did not challenge 
the state's ultimate substantive decision, but rather its 
authority to conduct proceedings to determine whether it should 
declare void ab initio certain contracts entered into by a 
utility pertaining to the purchase of power from, or payment for 
construction of, a nuclear power plant in Mississippi.  The court 
concluded that it "can hardly be doubted that a controversy 
sufficiently concrete for judicial review exists when the 
proceeding sought to be enjoined is already in progress."  Id. at 
410-411. 
  
 We also conclude that the issue here is ripe for 
adjudication.  The proceedings before the BRC have been ongoing 
for nearly one year.  The interest that Freehold seeks to 
vindicate in this proceeding is the right to be free from "state 
laws . . . respecting the rates . . . of electric utilities" and 
from the expense, delay, and uncertainty inherent in the 
administration of such laws.  If, as Freehold insists, the 
ongoing BRC proceedings constitute state regulation of utility 
rates and the burdens on Freehold occasioned by those proceedings 
are the kinds of burdens which Congress intended QFs to be 
spared, Congress' mandate would be frustrated if Freehold's right 
to judicial review were postponed.  There is a concrete dispute 
that has already worked a severe hardship upon Freehold, and a 
determination of the legal issue of preemption need not await any 
further developments before the BRC. 
 B. 
 The BRC and JCP&L rely on Equibank, N.A. v. Wheeling-
Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 884 F.2d 80, 86 (3d Cir. 1989), for the 
proposition that this court generally has declined to address 
issues that were not decided by the trial court absent 
exceptional circumstances.  In Equibank, however, we declined to 
address the merits because they had not been fully briefed by the 
parties and additional factfinding might have been required by 
the district court.  In contrast, the original complaint in this 
case sought summary judgment on the sole legal question of 
whether PURPA preempted the BRC's order which directed a hearing 
on Freehold's previously approved rate.  The parties have fully 
  
and repeatedly briefed this issue in the district court where 
they also engaged in substantial oral argument on the merits.  
Moreover, as previously alluded to, the increasing financial 
pressure and rising costs imposed on Freehold because of the 
protracted delay, the escalating interest rates in the financial 
market, and the probability that the entire project will no 
longer be viable if we remand, constitute exceptional 
circumstances warranting our resolution of the preemption issue.9 
 IV. 
    Our task is not to examine the merits underlying the  
controversy between JCP&L and Freehold over whether the PPA 
negotiated and executed in 1993 may be now revised and altered.  
No claim of fraud or mutual mistake of fact is alleged in the 
negotiation and execution of the PPA.  We must determine only 
whether PURPA preempted the BRC order, dated January 5, 1994, 
directing the parties to renegotiate the purchase rate terms of 
the PPA or, in the alternative, to negotiate an appropriate 
                     
9
.  Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277 (3d 
Cir.), cert. den. sub nom. Altran Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., 112 
S.Ct. 374 (1991), and Virgin Islands Conservation Soc. v. Virgin 
Islands Bd. of Land Use Appeals, 881 F.2d 28 (3d Cir. 1989), 
cited by JCP&L for the proposition that there are no "exceptional 
circumstances" justifying the resolution by this court of 
Freehold's motion for summary judgment are inapposite.  In both 
of these cases, this court only decided that it would not 
consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal without 
compelling circumstances.  In neither of these cases was the 
matter of compelling circumstances analyzed or briefed as they 
are here.   
  
buyout of the PPA, failing which the BRC would and did commence 
proceedings now pending before it.  We conclude that it does.10 
 A state law may not only be preempted expressly by 
Congress, but whenever it conflicts with federal law.  Fidelity 
Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 
(1982).  Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution, a federal agency acting within the scope of its 
congressionally delegated authority has the power to preempt 
state regulation and render unenforceable state or local laws 
which are otherwise not inconsistent with federal law.  Louisiana 
Public Service Com. v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368-69 (1986).   Of 
course, the application of the preemption doctrine requires a 
determination of congressional intent in enacting a federal law.  
That intent is not necessarily dependent on express congressional 
authorization to nullify or render partially or wholly 
unenforceable an inconsistent state law or regulation.  It also 
occurs "where Congress has legislated comprehensively, thus 
occupying the entire field of regulation and leaving no room for 
the States to supplement federal law, or where the state law 
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full objectives of Congress."  Id. at 368-69 (citation omitted). 
                     
10
.  The district court held that the dispute before the BRC 
arises under the PPA and presumed that it was not subject to 
preemption.  Freehold, however, has no dispute under the PPA; it 
filed a complaint in the district court to protect the terms and 
integrity of the PPA from unwarranted intrusion by the BRC.  The 
BRC is attempting to alter the terms of the PPA after having 
fully approved it in a final and non-appealable order.  We do not 
believe that Freehold's claim can correctly be characterized as a 
dispute under the PPA. 
  
 As we have previously stated in this opinion, Congress 
modified the Federal Power Act, which gave the FERC exclusive 
authority to regulate public utilities engaged in the sale of 
electric power at wholesale in interstate commerce, by enacting 
PURPA as part of a comprehensive legislative effort to solve a 
nationwide energy crisis and thus reduce the nation's dependence 
on fossil fuels.  In PURPA, Congress directed the FERC to 
promulgate regulations requiring public utilities to buy electric 
energy from and to sell electric energy to qualifying 
cogeneration facilities.  After extensive hearings, Congress 
concluded that the energy problem was nationwide in scope and 
therefore required "federal standards regarding retail sale of 
electricity, as well as federal attempts to encourage 
conservation and make efficient use of scarce energy resources."  
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 757. 
 Section 210 of PURPA sets forth the benefit to which 
QFs are entitled.  It creates a market for their energy by 
requiring that the FERC establish regulations that obligate 
public utilities to sell electric energy to and purchase electric 
energy from QFs.  16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a).  Section 210(b) requires 
the FERC to promulgate regulations to ensure that the rates for 
these purchases "shall be just and reasonable to the electric 
consumers of the electric utility in the public interest."  These 
rates may not exceed the incremental cost to the utility of 
purchasing alternative electric energy.  16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b).11  
                     
11
.  Where, as here, the PPA has a long-term, fixed price, 
tension may arise between this consumer protective provision of 
  
 Pursuant to PURPA's requirements, the FERC issued 
regulations which define the minimum operating and efficiency 
standards that cogeneration facilities must meet and the benefits 
to which they are entitled.  18 C.F.R. §§ 292.101-.211.  The 
regulations also authorize the FERC to revoke QF status for non-
compliance with its application and empower the FERC to waive 
operating and efficiency standards upon a showing that the QF 
produces significant energy savings.  18 C.F.R. § 292.205(c).  
Additionally, the regulations address the purchase of energy by 
utilities, and the cost to be paid to the QF supplying the energy 
and guidelines for calculating such costs.  18 C.F.R. § 292.301-
.308.  Thus, PURPA and the implementing regulations establish an 
extensive federal system to encourage and regulate the sale of 
electrical energy by QFs. 
 JCP&L claims that it and Freehold voluntarily agreed to 
the BRC's continuing jurisdiction over the PPA and the rates 
charged by Freehold thereunder.  This argument is based upon the 
BRC's unsuccessful effort in late 1993 to formulate a joint 
agreement between the parties modifying the PPA.  JCP&L also 
asserts that in the course of the ongoing proceeding initiated by 
the BRC to review the PPA, the BRC is reviewing documentary 
evidence and testimony concerning the meaning of the PPA's 
"regulatory-out" clause.  JCP&L maintains that the regulatory-out 
(..continued) 
PURPA and the FERC regulation permitting the parties to hold 
incremental avoidable cost at the level it has on the date the 
PPA is effective.  Whatever problem this may create is, however, 
a matter for FERC, not the BRC.  See also infra p. 30. 
  
clause grants the BRC continuing jurisdiction over rates.  
Finally, JCP&L argues that PURPA contains no express preemption 
claims and that implied preemption is not to be lightly presumed.  
In fact, it argues that there is a presumption against finding 
preemption of state law in areas traditionally regulated by the 
states. 
 Although the states are required under the federal 
statutory scheme to implement the federal rules, section 210(e) 
of PURPA requires that the FERC prescribe rules exempting QFs 
"from state laws and regulations respecting the rates, or 
respecting the financial or organizational regulation of electric 
utilities, or from any construction of the foregoing, if the 
Commission determines such exemption is necessary to encourage 
cogeneration and small power production."  16 U.S.C. § 824a-
3(a)(1).  As discussed earlier, the FERC promulgated regulations, 
pursuant to section 210(e)(1) of PURPA, exempting QFs from 
various federal and state regulatory requirements.   
 The BRC concedes that in adopting the regulation 
exempting cogenerators from state utility regulation, the FERC 
described the exemption as broad.  It takes heart, however, in 
FERC language stating that the exemption is "not intended to 
divest a State regulatory agency of its authority to review 
contracts for purchases as part of its regulation of electric 
utilities."  45 Fed. Reg. 12,233 (Feb. 25, 1980).  This 
misunderstands the interplay between sections 210(a) and 210(e).  
There is no dispute here that section 210(f) gives state 
regulatory authorities power to implement the requirements of 
  
section 210(a) and the relevant regulations.  In fact, both 
section 210(e)(3) and the applicable regulation, 18 C.F.R. 
§ 292.602(c)(2), expressly limit the exemptions from state law 
that QFs enjoy under § 210(e):  QFs simply are not exempt from 
state laws and regulations enacted pursuant to § 210(f) and, with 
it, § 210(a).   
 Thus, if a case concerns implementation procedures 
contemplated by § 210(f), then the action is properly covered by 
§ 210(g), and, therefore, federal jurisdiction would be improper.  
Here, on the other hand, the BRC's implementation of FERC's § 
210(a)-type regulations ended with BRC's July 8, 1992 approval of 
the PPA.  The present attempt to either modify the PPA or revoke 
BRC approval is "utility-type" regulation -- exactly the type of 
regulation from which Freehold is immune under § 210(e).  As the 
explanatory note states, the regulations do not disturb the 
authority of state regulatory agencies "to review contracts for 
purchases" so long as those regulations are "consistent with the 
terms, policies and practices of sections 210 and 201 of PURPA 
and [FERC's] implementing regulations.  If the authority or its 
exercise is in conflict, . . . the State must yield to the 
Federal requirements." 
 Absent legislative restriction, the BRC also asserts, 
reconsideration of its prior approval of the PPA is inherent in 
the authority of all administrative agencies and not necessarily 
a characteristic unique to rate-making bodies.  However, in this 
instance, there is specific federal statutory legislation, PURPA, 
that bars reconsideration of the prior approval of the PPA at 
  
least absent some basis in the law of contracts for setting aside 
the PPA.  No such basis is referred to here. Based on the overall 
scheme of PURPA and its stated goal, and especially section 
210(e) and the implementing rules promulgated by the FERC, we 
hold that Congress intended to exempt qualified cogenerators from 
state and federal utility rate regulations. 
 Two recent cases support our conclusion.  In  
Independent Energy Producers, 36 F.3d 848, the Energy Producers 
sought an injunction in the federal district court to prevent the  
California Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC") from implementing 
an order which delegated to the defendant-utilities the authority 
to enforce federal operating and efficiency requirements set out 
in PURPA and in the regulations promulgated by the FERC.  As in 
this case, the plaintiff QF and the utilities entered into 
contracts for the sale and purchase of electric energy.  The 
contracts contained standardized terms and the rates to be paid 
the QFs.  In 1991, the utilities and the CPUC created a program 
which authorized the utilities to monitor the compliance with 
federal operating and efficiency standards by the QFs with which 
they had contracts.  If a utility determined that a QF did not 
meet federal operating and efficiency standards, it was 
authorized to suspend payment of the rates specified in the 
contract and substitute a lower alternative rate.  Independent 
Energy Producers challenged this program, contending that the 
FERC's authority is exclusive and the state program is preempted 
by federal law.  The district court disagreed and held there was 
no preemption.   
  
 The court of appeals reversed.  It concluded that the 
FERC regulations carry out the statutory scheme reposed in its 
exclusive authority to make QF determinations for the revocation 
of QF status or waive compliance with QF standards, they nowhere 
"contemplate a role for the state in setting QF standards or 
determining QF status."  Id. at 854.  For reasons of policy, it 
held that a "uniform federal decision maker is necessary" in the 
public interest and that the CPUC program was preempted by 
federal law.  Id. 
 One of the issues raised in Smith Cogeneration, Inc. v. 
Corporation Comm'n, 863 P.2d 1227 (Okla. 1993), is even more 
analogous to this case.  A rule of the Oklahoma Corporation 
Commission required QFs and electrical utilities to include in 
their non-negotiated cogeneration purchase contracts a notice 
provision allowing reconsideration and modification by the 
Corporation Commission of avoided costs after the contract had 
been agreed upon.  The cogenerator argued that the Corporation  
Commission rule directly conflicted with PURPA and the FERC 
regulations, discouraged cogeneration, and was preempted by 
federal law.  Although the cogenerator acknowledged that states 
have broad authority to implement PURPA, it insisted that any 
utility-type regulation over cogeneration contracts directly 
conflicted with PURPA. 
 As Freehold does here, the cogenerator in Smith argued 
that any attempt to revisit a cogeneration contract, as a result 
of changed circumstances, deprives QFs of the benefits of the 
bargain and that the state rule, unless waived, stands as a 
  
direct obstruction to obtain the necessary financing for the 
project.  The Corporation Commission and the utilities argued to 
the contrary. 
 The Oklahoma court, after examining the preamble to the 
FERC regulations and PURPA, concluded that reconsideration of 
long term contracts with established estimated costs imposes 
utility-type regulations over QFs.  "PURPA and FERC regulations 
seek to prevent reconsideration of such contracts.  The 
legislative history behind PURPA confirms that Congress did not 
intend to impose traditional utility type rate-making concepts on 
sales by qualifying facilities to utilities."  Id. at 1240-1241.  
Accordingly, the court held that PURPA and FERC regulations 
preempted the State Commission rule.   
 JCP&L attempts to distinguish this case from Smith on 
the ground that the challenged rule in Smith would impact on 
financing, but that in this case, the BRC's "pre-financing review 
of the PPA will have no such impact."  Such a distinction is 
illusory.  The Oklahoma court did not rest its preemption holding 
merely on the impact of the Commission rule on financing, but 
primarily on the obligation and rights of the parties under a 
negotiated and executed contract.  Here, the facts favor Freehold 
more strongly than they did the cogenerator in Smith.  In Smith, 
the cogenerator did not yet have a signed contract; Freehold does 
and the preemption issue is precisely the same.  Besides, we 
cannot disregard the impact on cogeneration financing if a 
purchase power agreement is at any time in the future subject to 
the arbitrary reconsideration by a state utility regulatory body. 
  
 Finally, the defendants maintain that preemption is 
inappropriate because JCP&L and Freehold voluntarily agreed to 
exempt the PPA from PURPA.  They note correctly that FERC 
regulations specifically contemplate voluntary agreements outside 
of PURPA's umbrella.  See 18 C.F.R. § 292.301(b); see also 
American Paper Institute, Inc., 461 U.S. at 416 (stating that "a 
qualifying facility and a utility may negotiate a contract" that 
constitutes "a waiver" of PURPA).  They claim that Freehold, in a 
"regulatory-out" clause,12 agreed to waive its section 210(e) and 
                     
12
.  The "regulatory-out" clause provides in pertinent part: 
 
 20.2(a)  The parties recognize and 
acknowledge that this agreement and the rates 
to be paid to the Seller [Freehold] for 
energy and capacity for the Facility are 
premised upon and subject to the Company's 
[JCP&L] continuing ability to timely and 
fully recover from its customers all such 
costs and charges paid to the Seller 
hereunder for energy and capacity throughout 
the term hereof.  Consequently, in the event 
that the BRC, the FERC or any legislative, 
judicial, administrative or other 
governmental agency having jurisdiction over 
the parties, . . . should disallow in whole 
or in part or otherwise impair the full and 
timely recovery by the Company from its 
customers of any energy and capacity payments 
made or to be made to the Seller hereunder, 
then, at the option of the Seller, (i) the 
parties hereto shall promptly thereafter 
commence negotiations to approximately amend 
this Agreement to reduce the rates to be paid 
by the Company hereunder for energy and 
capacity to such rates as the BRC or such 
other governmental agency exercising 
jurisdiction shall have authorized the 
Company to recover through operation of its 
Levelized Energy Adjustment Clause ("LEAC") . 
. . on a full and timely basis or (ii) upon 
thirty (30) days prior written notice to the 
  
18 C.F.R. § 292.602(c)(1) rights to be free from state rate 
regulation or law.   
 As we have noted, insofar as the issues in this case 
are concerned, we find the "regulatory-out" clause unambiguous. 
It merely describes what would happen in the event that during 
the 20-year contract term JCP&L should for any reason lose its 
right to pass costs on to its ratepayers.  When this clause was 
agreed upon, the parties clearly did not expect that this right 
could be lost as a result of BRC action absent some change in the 
governing law.13  But the important aspect for present purposes 
is that this clause does not purport to confer on the BRC any 
jurisdiction it would not otherwise have.  In particular, it 
reflects no intent on the part of Freehold to surrender any of 
the protection from state rate regulation conferred upon it by § 
210(a). 
  V. 
 In summary, we conclude that the district court had 
subject matter jurisdiction to consider Freehold's claims and 
(..continued) 
Company, the Seller may terminate this 
Agreement and neither party shall have any 
further liability or obligation hereunder 
except for amounts due prior to the date of 
termination . . . . 
13
.  In the BRC's 1992 order approving the PPA, the BRC committed 
itself and its successors to "allow JCP&L to flow-through and/or 
fully and timely recover the rates specified in [the PPA] and the 
costs resulting therefrom . . . ." 
 
A July 1, 1988, Stipulation and Settlement relied upon by the BRC 
in approving the present PPA states that the BRC will not 
readjust contract rates or preclude flow through.   
  
that the jurisdictional limits of section 210(g) of PURPA did not 
bar jurisdiction of this action.  We also hold that the district 
court erred in concluding that the Johnson Act precludes federal 
jurisdiction and that Freehold's claim involves solely a 
contractual dispute subject to the jurisdiction of the state 
utility regulatory agency under the choice of law and forum 
provisions of the PPA.  We reject the argument that any of the 
abstention doctrines apply in any manner to these proceedings.  
Finally, we hold that once the BRC approved the power purchase 
agreement between Freehold and JCP&L on the ground that the rates 
were consistent with avoided cost, just, reasonably, and 
prudentially incurred, any action or order by the BRC to 
reconsider its approval or to deny the passage of those rates to 
JCP&L's consumers under purported state authority was preempted 
by federal law. 
 The order of the district court will be reversed and 
the case remanded with direction to enter summary judgment in 
favor of the appellant and for such further proceedings as are 
consistent with this opinion.  Costs taxed against the appellees. 
